December 2021, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) made a quiet but consequential move. Following the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Alexandria’s recognition of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine — a decision Moscow viewed as a direct provocation — Russia’s Holy Synod broke communion with Alexandria and announced the creation of the Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa, a rival structure to govern Orthodox communities across the continent.

At the time, the ROC had a presence in just four African countries. By early 2026, it had established parishes in 36, with over 370 communities and more than 260 priestsoperating across the continent. This is, by the ROC’s own account, potentially the most significant geographical expansion in its history. But the speed, scale, and architecture of that expansion raises questions that go well beyond theology.

The trigger

The split within global Orthodoxy had been building since 2019, when the Patriarchate of Alexandria recognised the independent Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Moscow’s response was to cut ties with Alexandria and declare open competition for the continent’s Orthodox communities. What has followed is not a grassroots spiritual revival. It is an organised, well-resourced campaign to absorb existing parishes and build new ones.

What this is really about

In countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic, the arrival of Orthodox clergy has coincided with deepening political ties to Russia. In Mali, the ROC’s Patriarchal Exarch consecrated a chapel at an Africa Corps military deployment site in November 2025. A similar consecration took place at an Africa Corps site in Niger in January 2026. Both events were highlighted by the Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa’s own communications.

The European Council on Foreign Relations has concludedthat the ROC is actively engaged in promoting anti-Western narratives and building conservative coalitions under Russian patronage. Its expansion is not primarily about converting the unconverted. It is about building a network of communities, clergy, and local elites that is culturally and institutionally aligned with Moscow.

Bishop Joshua Dhube, the retired head of the United Baptist Church in Zimbabwe and a former government minister, has described the ROC as the Kremlin’s Trojan Horse for winning hearts and minds in Africa. Father Evangelos Thiani an academic and Kenyan priest in the Greek Orthodox Churchhas argued that religion occupies a central place in African public life, making it an ideal vehicle for influence, one that operates below the threshold of military and economic tools that attract international scrutiny.

 

How it works

The recruitment model is straightforward. Local priests, many of whom have trained at theological seminaries in Nairobi and other African cities, are offered an attractive package compared to other churches comptising of higher salaries, faster ordination, church construction, and educational opportunities for their children according to research by Father Evangelos Thiani.

A Madagascan priest, Alexey Herizo, described waiting years for ordination within the Greek Orthodox Church before turning to the ROC. He completed online training at a Moscow seminary, followed by three months of practical training, and was ordained first as a deacon and then as a priest within days. He told an international media house that the salaries provided by the ROC allow clergy to live with dignity and meet their families’ basic needs, a significant consideration in communities where congregations are too poor to support their own clergy.

Beyond individual recruitment, the ROC has moved to build permanent infrastructure. Land is secured through negotiations with local authorities. Churches, schools, and clinics are constructed. Humanitarian aid, including motorcycles for priests to reach remote communities, is distributed. Every element of this activity is covered by local media, often with funding attached.

Who is paying

While this all seems positive for the newly-ordained clergy,the financing points directly to the Russian state and comes with clear strings attached. The European Council on Foreign Relations has documented that the ROC works closely with Russian state-backed corporations to finance its growth, with major sponsors including Russian Railways, Rosatom, and Rusal. The first group of students from Kenya, Rwanda, and Nigeria to train at the St Petersburg Theological Academy in November 2022 was a project financed by Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear corporation, which incorporates Russia’s nuclear weapons complex.

This is not incidental. It is structural.

The broader picture

Russia’s broader aim on the continent is diplomatic: to garner support from a region with 54 votes at the United Nations. The ROC’s expansion is one component of a wider campaign that also includes Russian Houses, expanded scholarship programmes, Russian-language media, and military cooperation agreements with 43 African governmentsincluding most recently with South Sudan.

There are also documented allegations that Africans are being recruited with promises of work, only to be redirected into military roles. At least 15 Zimbabweans have been reported dead after fighting for Russia in Ukraine. Ukraine estimated in late 2025 that over 1,400 Africans were currently enlisted in the Russian military.

The church, in this context, is not a parallel operation. It is a complement, building cultural legitimacy and community networks that make other forms of Russian engagement easier.

Kenya at the centre

No country illustrates the scale of the ROC’s ambitions more clearly than Kenya. The church received official registration in Kenya in February 2023. By mid-2026, over 100 priests were operating under the ROC in Kenya alone, the majority having transferred from the Patriarchate of Alexandria.

In September 2025, the Patriarchal Exarch conducted a 12-day pastoral visit, baptising 40 people, consecrating new churches, and visiting schools and orphanages, before concluding with a meeting with Russia’s Ambassador to Kenya. The sequence, spiritual then humanitarian then diplomatic, is consistent across every country in which the ROC operates.