From Syrian Jihadist Leader To Rebel Politician: How Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani Reinvented Himself

Tensions arose in 2013 when Baghdadi’s group in Iraq unilaterally declared the merger of the two groups (ISI and Nusra), declaring the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), and publicly revealing for the first time the links between them.

Jawlani resisted, as he wanted to distance his group from ISI’s violent tactics, leading to a split.

To get out of that sticky situation, Jawlani pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, making Nusra Front its Syrian branch.

From the start, he prioritised winning Syrian support, distancing himself from IS’s brutality and emphasising a more pragmatic approach to jihad.

In April 2013, al-Nusra Front became al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, putting it at odds with IS.

While Jawlani’s move was partly an attempt to maintain local support and avoid alienating Syrians and rebel factions, the al-Qaeda affiliation ultimately did little to benefit this effort.

It became a pressing challenge in 2015 when Nusra and other factions captured Idlib province, forcing them to co-operate in its administration.

Jawlani rebranded al-Nusra Front as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in 2016. The following year it became Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

In 2016, Jawlani severed ties with al-Qaeda, rebranding the group as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017.

While initially appearing superficial, the split revealed deeper divisions. Al-Qaeda accused Jawlani of betrayal, leading to defections and the formation of Hurras al-Din, a new al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, which HTS later crushed in 2020. Members of Hurras al-Din, however, have remained cautiously present in the region.

HTS also targeted IS operatives and foreign fighters in Idlib, dismantling their networks and forcing some to undergo “deradicalisation” programmes.

These moves, justified as efforts to unify militant forces and reduce infighting, signalled Jawlani’s strategy to position HTS as a dominant and politically viable force in Syria.

Despite the public split from al-Qaeda and name changes, HTS continued to be designated by the UN, US, UK and other countries as a terrorist organisation, and the US maintained a $10m reward for information about Jawlani’s whereabouts. Western powers considered the break-up to be a façade.

Forming a ‘government’ in Idlib

Jawlani gave a press conference following the devastating 2023 earthquakes in Syria

Under Jawlani, HTS became the dominant force in Idlib, north-west Syria’s largest rebel stronghold and home to about four million people, many of whom were displaced from other Syrian provinces.

To address concerns about a militant group governing the area, HTS established a civilian front, the so-called “Syrian Salvation Government” (SG) in 2017 as its political and administrative arm.

The SG functioned like a state, with a prime minister, ministries and local departments overseeing sectors such as education, health and reconstruction, while maintaining a religious council guided by Sharia, or Islamic law.

Jawlani was pictured looking at a painting of the Umayyad Mosque during a visit to a book, arts and culture fair in Idlib in 2022

For over a year leading up to the HTS-led rebel offensive on 27 November, Jawlani faced protests in Idlib from hardline Islamists as well as Syrian activists.

Critics compared his rule to Assad’s, accusing HTS of authoritarianism, suppressing dissent and silencing critics. Protesters labelled HTS’s security forces as “Shabbiha”, a term used to describe Assad’s loyalist henchmen.

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They further alleged that HTS deliberately avoided meaningful combat against government forces and marginalised jihadists and foreign fighters in Idlib to prevent them from engaging in such actions, all to appease international actors.

Even during the latest offensive, activists have persistently urged HTS to release individuals imprisoned in Idlib allegedly for expressing dissent.

In response to these criticisms, HTS initiated several reforms over the past year. It disbanded or rebranded a controversial security force accused of human rights violations and established a “Department of Grievances” to allow citizens to lodge complaints against the group. Its critics said these measures were just a show to contain dissent.

Earlier this year, protesters in Idlib demanded the release of detainees and an end to HTS’s rule.

To justify its consolidation of power in Idlib and the suppression of plurality among militant groups, HTS argued that unifying under a single leadership was crucial for making progress and ultimately overthrowing the Syrian government.

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HTS and its civilian arm, the SG, walked a tightrope, striving to project a modern, moderate image to win over both the local population and the international community, while simultaneously maintaining their Islamist identity to satisfy hardliners within rebel-held areas and HTS’s own ranks.

For instance, in December 2023, HTS and the SG faced a backlash after a “festival” held at a glossy new shopping mall was criticised by hardliners as “immoral”.

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And this August, a Paralympic Games-inspired ceremony drew sharp criticism from hardliners, prompting the SG to review the organisation of such events.

These incidents illustrate the challenges HTS faces in reconciling the expectations of its Islamist base with the broader demands of the Syrian population, who are seeking freedom and coexistence after years of authoritarian rule under Assad.

Leading a new path?

As the latest offensive unfolded, global media focused on Jawlani’s jihadist past, prompting some rebel supporters to call for him to step back, viewing him as a liability.

Although he previously expressed willingness to dissolve his group and step aside, his recent actions and public appearances tell a different story.

HTS’s success in uniting rebels and nearly capturing the whole country in under two weeks has strengthened Jawlani’s position, quieting hardline critics and accusations of opportunism.

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HTS and its allies launched the offensive that overthrew Assad at the end of November

Jawlani and the SG have since reassured domestic and international audiences.

To Syrians, including minorities, they promised safety; to neighbours and powers like Russia, they pledged peaceful relations. Jawlani even assured Russia its Syrian bases would remain unharmed if attacks ceased.

This shift reflects HTS’s “moderate jihad” strategy since 2017, emphasising pragmatism over rigid ideology.

Jawlani’s approach could signal the decline of global jihad movements like IS and al-Qaeda, whose inflexibility is increasingly seen as ineffective and unsustainable.

His trajectory might inspire other groups to adapt, marking either a new era of localised, politically flexible “jihadism” or just a temporary divergence from the traditional path in order to make political and territorial gains.