Rigging Of The Election, Data Analysis Shows Results Announced By Chebukati Don’t Match With Those On Website In All Counties

As of August 19, 2017, there are at least three sets of different Kenyan presidential results, this is according to a report by Kura Yangu, Sauti Yangu Group.

First, there is IEBC Chairman Wafula Chebukati’s verbally announced result on August 11, which include county-level valid votes cast for each presidential candidate, along with county-level numbers of registered voters.

Second, there are the results displayed on the IEBC website, which includes valid votes, rejected votes, rejected-objected-to votes, and disputed votes for each presidential candidate. These results are available at the polling station, constituency and county levels.

Third, there are the scanned results documented in Forms 34B, which started to appear on the website a week after the announcement had been made. Two are missing entirely. Not all forms are complete. They are formatted to include specific information, including polling station-level valid votes cast for each presidential candidates. Most – but not all – include information on rejected votes for each candidate, total valid and rejected votes for the entire constituency and total registered voters for the constituency. A few forms contain a count of rejected-objected-to and disputed votes.

All three sources for presidential results – the announced result; the website results;
and the information in the result forms – include significant and unexplained differences.
Data Differences and contradictions. Verbally announced results do not match the data in the IEBC website (as of August 19, 2017) in any single county. When comparing what was verbally announced with an aggregation of constituency-level Forms 34B at county levels, the two sets of results match in only four counties.

When results on the website are compared with the information in Forms 34B (constituency level), they match in only one county. This comparison is incomplete because two Forms 34B are completely missing from the IEBC’s portal and because 12 of the available Forms 34B are missing totals of valid votes.
Overall, then, there is a serious discrepancy between the officially announced presidential results and all other sources purporting to contain those results. To date, the source of the numbers on the website and in the announced results has not been explained.

Finally, multiple copies of Form 34B have emerged recently at constituency level, each with different totals. These multiples bear IEBC stamps and signatures. It is impossible for KYSY to determine which version is original and true.

A comparison of Forms 34B and the data on the IEBC website reveals significant differences in the numbers of rejected votes – they do not match in 99.3 percent of constituencies. The number of rejected votes as recorded in Form 34B and on the website are the same in only two constituencies. Some of the differences are very high. In Narok
North, for example, the Form 34B on the documentation site shows 7,568 less rejected votes than what the results site shows. This is because the Form 34B shows 0 total rejected votes. Similarly, in Nyatike, the Form 34B in the documentation site shows 6,250 fewer votes than the results site.

KYSY has shown evidence of turnout in excess of 100 percent, as recorded on the IEBC website. Further examination of Forms 34B, it is now evident that there are cases in which the number of valid votes exceeds the number of people who turned out to vote. According to IEBC regulations, all results from such a polling station should be canceled.

How IEBC results system was meant to work

Ten days after the announcement, documentation on the website portal of the IEBC (Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission) remains incomplete and numbers are wildly contradictory. The public expectation, created by the IEBC itself, was that presidential results would not and could not be announced without supporting documentation displayed on the website.

Ezra Chiloba, the electoral board CEO, said during a simulation exercise of the electronic results transmission on August 2nd, that Kenyans would have real time access and be able to develop real time tallies of the polls. He reassured media and
the public, in general, they would have “unfettered access to all the results from all the polling stations” as the results came in.

Despite these assurances, parallel tallying efforts experienced severer pressure from the state throughout the election cycle. According to the IEBC, the electronic transmission system was configured so that the ‘submit’ button could only show after a full entry of data had been made, which included the scanned copy of the declaration form from the polling station. The numbers and the scanned images would be digitally transmitted simultaneously by the electronic system known as the Kenya Integrated Elections Management System, or KIEMS. IEBC Chairman Wafula Chebukati explicitly stated that “the primary document and what [IEBC] will use as the final result- is the scanned document”

The IEBC had continually emphasized the accountability aspect of this transmission system both publicly and privately. With Kenya’s history of disputed elections, it was key to confidence. Chris Msando, the murdered former IEBC Technology Manager, headed up the results transmission system. He told KYSY on May 16th, in a
public forum, that the electronic system had been set up for simultaneous transmission in a manner that allowed for public tallying – numbers could be checked against the scanned images of the forms as the results came in.

Chris Msando’s body was found two days before the scheduled dry-run of the results transmission exercise. That the ICT Manager of the Electoral Commission was found dead, tortured and missing an arm is alarming, particularly if IEBC’s systems’ security requires finger or thumb prints. It seems reasonable to be suspicious that the integrity of the IEBC’s systems was compromised.

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